History of the proceedings and submissions of the Parties (paras. 1-12)

The Court recalls that on 17 October 2000 the Democratic Republic of the Congo (hereinafter "the Congo") filed in the Registry of the Court an Application instituting proceedings against the Kingdom of Belgium (hereinafter "Belgium") in respect of a dispute concerning an "international arrest warrant issued on 11 April 2000 by a Belgian investigating judge . . . against the Minister for Foreign Affairs in office of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi".

In that Application the Congo contended that Belgium had violated the "principle that a State may not exercise its authority on the territory of another State", the "principle of sovereign equality among all Members of the United Nations, as laid down in Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations", as well as "the diplomatic immunity of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of a sovereign State, as recognized by the jurisprudence of the Court and following from Article 41, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention of 18 April 1961 on Diplomatic Relations". In order to found the Court’s jurisdiction the Congo invoked in the aforementioned Application the fact that "Belgium ha[d] accepted the jurisdiction of the Court and, in so far as may be required, the [aforementioned] Application signifie[d] acceptance of that jurisdiction by the Democratic Republic of the Congo".

The Court further recalls that on the same day, the Congo also filed a request for the indication of a provisional measure; and that by an Order of 8 December 2000 the Court, on the one hand, rejected Belgium’s request that the case be removed from the List and, on the other, held that the circumstances, as they then presented themselves to the Court, were not such as to require the exercise of its power under Article 41 of the Statute to indicate provisional measures. In the same Order, the Court also held that "it [was] desirable that the issues before the Court should be determined as soon as possible" and that "it [was] therefore appropriate to ensure that a decision on the Congo’s Application be reached with all expedition".

By Order of 13 December 2000, the President of the Court, taking account of the agreement of the Parties as expressed at a meeting held with their Agents on 8 December 2000, fixed time-limits for the filing of a Memorial by the Congo and of a Counter-Memorial by Belgium, addressing both issues of jurisdiction and admissibility and the merits. After the pleadings had been filed within the time-limits as subsequently extended, public hearings were held from 15 to 19 October 2001.

At the oral proceedings, the following final submissions were presented by the Parties:

On behalf of the Government of the Congo,

"In light of the facts and arguments set out during the written and oral proceedings, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo requests the Court to adjudge and declare that:

1. by issuing and internationally circulating the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 against Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, Belgium committed a violation in regard to the Democratic Republic of the Congo of the rule of customary international law concerning the absolute inviolability and immunity from criminal process of incumbent foreign ministers; in so doing, it violated the principle of sovereign equality among States;

2. a formal finding by the Court of the unlawfulness of that act constitutes an appropriate form of satisfaction, providing reparation for the consequent moral injury to the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

3. the violations of international law underlying the issue and international circulation of the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 preclude any State, including Belgium, from executing it;

4. Belgium shall be required to recall and cancel the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 and to inform the foreign authorities to whom the warrant was circulated that Belgium renounces its request for their co-operation in executing the unlawful warrant."

On behalf of the Government of Belgium,

"For the reasons stated in the Counter-Memorial of Belgium and in its oral submissions, Belgium requests the Court, as a preliminary matter, to adjudge and declare that the Court lacks jurisdiction in this case and/or that the Application by the Democratic Republic of the Congo against Belgium is inadmissible.

If, contrary to the submissions of Belgium with regard to the Court’s jurisdiction and the admissibility of the Application, the Court concludes that it does have jurisdiction in this case and that the Application by the Democratic Republic of the Congo is admissible, Belgium requests the Court to reject the submissions of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the merits of the case and to dismiss the Application."

Background to the case (paras. 13-21)

On 11 April 2000 an investigating judge of the Brussels tribunal de première instance issued "an international arrest warrant in absentia" against Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, charging him, as perpetrator or co-perpetrator, with offences constituting grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and of the Additional Protocols thereto, and with crimes against humanity. The arrest warrant was circulated internationally through Interpol.

At the time when the arrest warrant was issued Mr. Yerodia was the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Congo.

The crimes with which Mr. Yerodia was charged were punishable in Belgium under the Law of 16 June 1993 "concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches of the International Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and of Protocols I and II of 8 June 1977 Additional Thereto", as amended by the Law of 19 February 1999 "concerning the Punishment of Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law" (hereinafter referred to as the "Belgian Law").

On 17 October 2000, the Congo instituted proceedings before the International Court of Justice, requesting the Court "to declare that the Kingdom of Belgium shall annul the international arrest warrant issued on 11 April 2000". After the proceedings were instituted, Mr. Yerodia ceased to hold office as Minister for Foreign Affairs, and subsequently ceased to hold any ministerial office.

In its Application instituting proceedings, the Congo relied on two separate legal grounds. First, it claimed that "[t]he universal jurisdiction that the Belgian State attributes to itself under Article 7 of the Law in question" constituted a "[v]iolation of the principle that a State may not exercise its authority on the territory of another State and of the principle of sovereign equality among all Members of the United Nations". Secondly, it claimed that "[t]he non-recognition, on the basis of Article 5 . . . of the Belgian Law, of the immunity of a Minister for Foreign Affairs in office" constituted a "[v]iolation of the diplomatic immunity of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of a sovereign State". However, the Congo’s Memorial and its final submissions refer only to a violation "in regard to the . . . Congo of the rule of customary international law concerning the absolute inviolability and immunity from criminal process of incumbent foreign ministers".

Objections of Belgium relating to jurisdiction, mootness and admissibility (paras. 22-44)

Belgium’s first objection (paras. 23-28)

The Court begins by considering the first objection presented by Belgium, which reads as follows:

"That, in the light of the fact that Mr. Yerodia Ndombasi is no longer either Minister for Foreign Affairs of the [Congo] or a minister occupying any other position in the . . . Government [of the Congo], there is no longer a ‘legal dispute’ between the Parties within the meaning of this term in the Optional Clause Declarations of the Parties and that the Court accordingly lacks jurisdiction in this case."

The Court recalls that, according to its settled jurisprudence, its jurisdiction must be determined at the time that the act instituting proceedings was filed. Thus, if the Court has jurisdiction on the date the case is referred to it, it continues to do so regardless of subsequent events. Such events might lead to a finding that an application has subsequently become moot and to a decision not to proceed to judgment on the merits, but they cannot deprive the Court of jurisdiction.

The Court then finds that, on the date that the Congo’s Application instituting these proceedings was filed, each of the Parties was bound by a declaration of acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction, filed in accordance with Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court: Belgium by a declaration of 17 June 1958 and the Congo by a declaration of 8 February 1989. Those declarations contained no reservation applicable to the present case. The Court further observes that it is, moreover, not contested by the Parties that at the material time there was a legal dispute between them concerning the international lawfulness of the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 and the consequences to be drawn if the warrant was unlawful. The Court accordingly concludes that at the time that it was seised of the case it had jurisdiction to deal with it, and that it still has such jurisdiction, and that Belgium’s first objection must therefore be rejected.

Belgium’s second objection (paras. 29-32)

The second objection presented by Belgium is the following:

"That in the light of the fact that Mr. Yerodia Ndombasi is no longer either Minister for Foreign Affairs of the [Congo] or a minister occupying any other position in the . . . Government [of the Congo], the case is now without object and the Court should accordingly decline to proceed to judgment on the merits of the case."

The Court notes that it has already affirmed on a number of occasions that events occurring subsequent to the filing of an application may render the application without object such that the Court is not called upon to give a decision thereon. However, the Court considers that this is not such a case. It finds that the change which has occurred in the situation of Mr. Yerodia has not in fact put an end to the dispute between the Parties and has not deprived the Application of its object. The Congo argues that the arrest warrant issued by the Belgian judicial authorities against Mr. Yerodia was and remains unlawful. It asks the Court to hold that the warrant is unlawful, thus providing redress for the moral injury which the warrant allegedly caused to it. The Congo also continues to seek the cancellation of the warrant. For its part, Belgium contends that it did not act in violation of international law and it disputes the Congo’s submissions. In the view of the Court, it follows from the foregoing that the Application of the Congo is not now without object and that accordingly the case is not moot. Belgium’s second objection is accordingly rejected.

Belgium’s third objection (paras. 33-36)

The third Belgian objection is put as follows:

"That the case as it now stands is materially different to that set out in the [Congo]’s Application instituting proceedings and that the Court accordingly lacks jurisdiction in the case and/or that the application is inadmissible."

The Court notes that, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, it "cannot, in principle, allow a dispute brought before it by application to be transformed by amendments in the submissions into another dispute which is different in character". However, the Court considers that in the present case the facts underlying the Application have not changed in a way that produced such a transformation in the dispute brought before it. The question submitted to the Court for decision remains whether the issue and circulation of the arrest warrant by the Belgian judicial authorities against a person who was at that time the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Congo were contrary to international law. The Congo’s final submissions arise "directly out of the question which is the subject-matter of that Application". In these circumstances, the Court considers that Belgium cannot validly maintain that the dispute brought before the Court was transformed in a way that affected its ability to prepare its defence, or that the requirements of the sound administration of justice were infringed. Belgium’s third objection is accordingly rejected.

Belgium’s fourth objection (paras. 37-40)

The fourth Belgian objection reads as follows:

"That, in the light of the new circumstances concerning Mr. Yerodia Ndombasi, the case has assumed the character of an action of diplomatic protection but one in which the individual being protected has failed to exhaust local remedies, and that the Court accordingly lacks jurisdiction in the case and/or that the application is inadmissible."

The Court notes that the Congo has never sought to invoke before it Mr. Yerodia’s personal rights. It considers that, despite the change in professional situation of Mr. Yerodia, the character of the dispute submitted to the Court by means of the Application has not changed: the dispute still concerns the lawfulness of the arrest warrant issued on 11 April 2000 against a person who was at the time Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Congo, and the question whether the rights of the Congo have or have not been violated by that warrant. The Court finds that, as the Congo is not acting in the context of protection of one of its nationals, Belgium cannot rely upon the rules relating to the exhaustion of local remedies.

In any event, the Court recalls that an objection based on non-exhaustion of local remedies relates to the admissibility of the application. Under settled jurisprudence, the critical date for determining the admissibility of an application is the date on which it is filed. Belgium accepts that, on the date on which the Congo filed the Application instituting proceedings, the Congo had a direct legal interest in the matter, and was asserting a claim in its own name. Belgium’s fourth objection is accordingly rejected.

Belgium’s subsidiary argument concerning the non ultra petita rule (paras. 41-43)

As a subsidiary argument, Belgium further contends that "[i]n the event that the Court decides that it does have jurisdiction in this case and that the application is admissible, . . . the non ultra petita rule operates to limit the jurisdiction of the Court to those issues that are the subject of the [Congo]’s final submissions".

Belgium points out that the Congo initially advanced a twofold argument, based, on the one hand, on the Belgian judge’s lack of jurisdiction and, on the other, on the immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed by its Minister for Foreign Affairs. According to Belgium, the Congo now confines itself to arguing the latter point, and the Court consequently cannot rule on the issue of universal jurisdiction in any decision it renders on the merits of the case.

The Court recalls the well-established principle that "it is the duty of the Court not only to reply to the questions as stated in the final submissions of the parties, but also to abstain from deciding points not included in those submissions" The Court observes that, while it is thus not entitled to decide upon questions not asked of it, the non ultra petita rule nonetheless cannot preclude the Court from addressing certain legal points in its reasoning. Thus in the present case the Court may not rule, in the operative part of its Judgment, on the question whether the disputed arrest warrant, issued by the Belgian investigating judge in exercise of his purported universal jurisdiction, complied in that regard with the rules and principles of international law governing the jurisdiction of national courts. This does not mean, however, that the Court may not deal with certain aspects of that question in the reasoning of its Judgment, should it deem this necessary or desirable.

Merits of the case (paras. 45-71)

As indicated above, in its Application instituting these proceedings, the Congo originally challenged the legality of the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 on two separate grounds: on the one hand, Belgium’s claim to exercise a universal jurisdiction and, on the other, the alleged violation of the immunities of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Congo then in office. However, in its submissions in its Memorial, and in its final submissions at the close of the oral proceedings, the Congo invokes only the latter ground.

The Court observes that, as a matter of logic, the second ground should be addressed only once there has been a determination in respect of the first, since it is only where a State has jurisdiction under international law in relation to a particular matter that there can be any question of immunities in regard to the exercise of that jurisdiction. However, in the present case, and in view of the final form of the Congo’s submissions, the Court first addresses the question whether, assuming that it had jurisdiction under international law to issue and circulate the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000, Belgium in so doing violated the immunities of the then Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Congo.

Immunity and inviolability of an incumbent Foreign Minister in general (paras. 47-55)

The Court observes at the outset that in international law it is firmly established that, as also diplomatic and consular agents, certain holders of high-ranking office in a State, such as the Head of State, Head of Government and Minister for Foreign Affairs, enjoy immunities from jurisdiction in other States, both civil and criminal. For the purposes of the present case, it is only the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability of an incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs that fall for the Court to consider.

The Court notes that a certain number of treaty instruments were cited by the Parties in this regard, including the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961 and the New York Convention on Special Missions of 8 December 1969. The Court finds that these conventions provide useful guidance on certain aspects of the question of immunities, but that they do not contain any provision specifically defining the immunities enjoyed by Ministers for Foreign Affairs. It is consequently on the basis of customary international law that the Court must decide the questions relating to the immunities of such Ministers raised in the present case.

In customary international law, the immunities accorded to Ministers for Foreign Affairs are not granted for their personal benefit, but to ensure the effective performance of their functions on behalf of their respective States. In order to determine the extent of these immunities, the Court must therefore first consider the nature of the functions exercised by a Minister for Foreign Affairs. After an examination of those functions, the Court concludes that they are such that, throughout the duration of his or her office, a Minister for Foreign Affairs when abroad enjoys full immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability. That immunity and that inviolability protect the individual concerned against any act of authority of another State which would hinder him or her in the performance of his or her duties.

The Court finds that in this respect no distinction can be drawn between acts performed by a Minister for Foreign Affairs in an "official" capacity and those claimed to have been performed in a "private capacity", or, for that matter, between acts performed before the person concerned assumed office as Minister for Foreign Affairs and acts committed during the period of office. Thus, if a Minister for Foreign Affairs is arrested in another State on a criminal charge, he or she is clearly thereby prevented from exercising the functions of his or her office. Furthermore, even the mere risk that, by travelling to or transiting another State, a Minister for Foreign Affairs might be exposing himself or herself to legal proceedings could deter the Minister from travelling internationally when required to do so for the purposes of the performance of his or her official functions.

The Court then addresses Belgium’s argument that immunities accorded to incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs can in no case protect them where they are suspected of having committed war crimes or crimes against humanity.

The Court states that it has carefully examined State practice, including national legislation and those few decisions of national higher courts, such as the House of Lords in the United Kingdom or the French Court of Cassation, and that it has been unable to deduce from this practice that there exists under customary international law any form of exception to the rule according immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability to incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs, where they are suspected of having committed war crimes or crimes against humanity. The Court adds that it has also examined the rules concerning the immunity or criminal responsibility of persons having an official capacity contained in the legal instruments creating international criminal tribunals, and which are specifically applicable to the latter (see Charter of the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg, Art. 7; Charter of the International Military Tribunal of Tokyo, Art. 6; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Art. 7, para. 2; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Art. 6, para. 2; Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 27), and that it finds that these rules likewise do not enable it to conclude that any such exception exists in customary international law in regard to national courts. Finally, the Court observes that none of the decisions of the Nuremberg and Tokyo international military tribunals, or of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, cited by Belgium deal with the question of the immunities of incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs before national courts where they are accused of having committed war crimes or crimes against humanity. The Court accordingly notes that those decisions are in no way at variance with the findings it has reached above. The Court accordingly does not accept Belgium’s argument in this regard.

It further notes that the rules governing the jurisdiction of national courts must be carefully distinguished from those governing jurisdictional immunities: jurisdiction does not imply absence of immunity, while absence of immunity does not imply jurisdiction. Thus, although various international conventions on the prevention and punishment of certain serious crimes impose on States obligations of prosecution or extradition, thereby requiring them to extend their criminal jurisdiction, such extension of jurisdiction in no way affects immunities under customary international law, including those of Ministers for Foreign Affairs. The Court emphasizes, however, that the immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed by incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs does not mean that they enjoy impunity in respect of any crimes they might have committed, irrespective of their gravity. Jurisdictional immunity may well bar prosecution for a certain period or for certain offences; it cannot exonerate the person to whom it applies from all criminal responsibility. Accordingly, the immunities enjoyed under international law by an incumbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs do not represent a bar to criminal prosecution in certain circumstances. The Court refers to circumstances where such persons are tried in their own countries, where the State which they represent or have represented decides to waive that immunity, where such persons no longer enjoy all of the immunities accorded by international law in other States after ceasing to hold the office of Minister for Foreign Affairs, and where such persons are subject to criminal proceedings before certain international criminal courts, where they have jurisdiction.

The issue and circulation of the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 (paras. 62-71)

Given the conclusions it has reached above concerning the nature and scope of the rules governing the immunity from criminal jurisdiction enjoyed by incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs, the Court then considers whether in the present case the issue of the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 and its international circulation violated those rules. The Court recalls in this regard that the Congo requests it, in its first final submission, to adjudge and declare that:

"[B]y issuing and internationally circulating the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 against Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, Belgium committed a violation in regard to the Democratic Republic of the Congo of the rule of customary international law concerning the absolute inviolability and immunity from criminal process of incumbent foreign ministers; in so doing, it violated the principle of sovereign equality among States."

After examining the terms of the arrest warrant, the Court notes that its issuance, as such, represents an act by the Belgian judicial authorities intended to enable the arrest on Belgian territory of an incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The fact that the warrant is enforceable is clearly apparent from the order given in it to "all bailiffs and agents of public authority . . . to execute this arrest warrant" and from the assertion in the warrant that "the position of Minister for Foreign Affairs currently held by the accused does not entail immunity from jurisdiction and enforcement". The Court notes that the warrant did admittedly make an exception for the case of an official visit by Mr. Yerodia to Belgium, and that Mr. Yerodia never suffered arrest in Belgium. The Court considers itself bound, however, to find that, given the nature and purpose of the warrant, its mere issue violated the immunity which Mr. Yerodia enjoyed as the Congo’s incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Court accordingly concludes that the issue of the warrant constituted a violation of an obligation of Belgium towards the Congo, in that it failed to respect the immunity of that Minister and, more particularly, infringed the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability then enjoyed by him under international law.

The Court also notes that Belgium admits that the purpose of the international circulation of the disputed arrest warrant was "to establish a legal basis for the arrest of Mr. Yerodia . . . abroad and his subsequent extradition to Belgium". The Court finds that, as in the case of the warrant’s issue, its international circulation from June 2000 by the Belgian authorities, given its nature and purpose, effectively infringed Mr. Yerodia’s immunity as the Congo’s incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs and was furthermore liable to affect the Congo’s conduct of its international relations. The Court concludes that the circulation of the warrant, whether or not it significantly interfered with Mr. Yerodia’s diplomatic activity, constituted a violation of an obligation of Belgium towards the Congo, in that it failed to respect the immunity of the incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Congo and, more particularly, infringed the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability then enjoyed by him under international law.

Remedies (paras. 72-77)

The Court then addresses the issue of the remedies sought by the Congo on account of Belgium’s violation of the above-mentioned rules of international law. (Cf. the second, third and fourth submissions of the Congo reproduced above).

The Court observes that it has already concluded that the issue and circulation of the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 by the Belgian authorities failed to respect the immunity of the incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Congo and, more particularly, infringed the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability then enjoyed by Mr. Yerodia under international law. Those acts engaged Belgium’s international responsibility. The Court considers that the findings so reached by it constitute a form of satisfaction which will make good the moral injury complained of by the Congo.

However, the Court goes on to observe that, as the Permanent Court of International Justice stated in its Judgment of 13 September 1928 in the case concerning the Factory at Chorzów:

"[t]he essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act - a principle which seems to be established by international practice and in particular by the decisions of arbitral tribunals - is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed" ( P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 17, p. 47).

The Court finds that, in the present case, "the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if [the illegal act] had not been committed" cannot be re-established merely by a finding by the Court that the arrest warrant was unlawful under international law. The warrant is still extant, and remains unlawful, notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Yerodia has ceased to be Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Court accordingly considers that Belgium must, by means of its own choosing, cancel the warrant in question and so inform the authorities to whom it was circulated.

The Court sees no need for any further remedy: in particular, the Court points out that it cannot, in a judgment ruling on a dispute between the Congo and Belgium, indicate what that judgment’s implications might be for third States, and the Court finds that it cannot therefore accept the Congo’s submissions on this point.

The full text of the operative paragraph (para. 78) reads as follows:

"For these reasons,

The Court,

(1) (A) By fifteen votes to one,

Rejects the objections of the Kingdom of Belgium relating to jurisdiction, mootness and admissibility;

For: President Guillaume; Vice-President Shi; Judges Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal; Judges ad hoc Bula-Bula, Van den Wyngaert;

Against: Judge Oda;

(B) By fifteen votes to one,

Finds that it has jurisdiction to entertain the Application filed by the Democratic Republic of the Congo on 17 October 2000;

For: President Guillaume; Vice-President Shi; Judges Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal; Judges ad hoc Bula-Bula, Van den Wyngaert;

Against: Judge Oda;

(C) By fifteen votes to one,

Finds that the Application of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is not without object and that accordingly the case is not moot;

For: President Guillaume; Vice-President Shi; Judges Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal; Judges ad hoc Bula-Bula, Van den Wyngaert;

Against: Judge Oda;

(D) By fifteen votes to one,

Finds that the Application of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is admissible;

For: President Guillaume; Vice-President Shi; Judges Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal; Judges ad hoc Bula-Bula, Van den Wyngaert;

Against: Judge Oda;

(2) By thirteen votes to three,

Finds that the issue against Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi of the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000, and its international circulation, constituted violations of a legal obligation of the Kingdom of Belgium towards the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in that they failed to respect the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability which the incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo enjoyed under international law;

For: President Guillaume; Vice-President Shi; Judges Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, Kooijmans, Rezek, Buergenthal; Judge ad hoc Bula-Bula;

Against: Judges Oda, Al-Khasawneh; Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert;

(3) By ten votes to six,

Finds that the Kingdom of Belgium must, by means of its own choosing, cancel the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 and so inform the authorities to whom that warrant was circulated;

For: President Guillaume; Vice-President Shi; Judges Ranjeva, Herczegh, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Parra-Aranguren, Rezek; Judge ad hoc Bula-Bula;

Against: Judges Oda, Higgins, Kooijmans, Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal; Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert."